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The concept of a worldview resonates with other concepts, such as those of ‘culture’, 
‘civilisation’, and ‘way of life’. Arguably, it is a modern phenomenon, the possibility of which 
was actualised at the dawn of the modern epoch. Nevertheless, in principle, its ‘possibility’ 
goes back as far as Plato’s Republic. It is Heidegger, however, who is most informative for 
understanding what a worldview is, as well as why the modern epoch is its time of provenance. 
Consequently, an analysis of Heidegger’s essay, ‘The time of the world picture’ (or worldview) 
provided the framework within which it was argued that worldviews are both blessings and 
curses in the current era: blessings, because, as Harries has argued, we have been disabused 
of the modern idea of one encompassing worldview or ideology, so that one can no longer 
believe in only a single ’correct’ view of the world; curses, because they bedevil any well-
intended attempts at communicating with understanding on issues of common concern. It 
was the burden of this article to provide a way of addressing this state of affairs with some 
hope of transcending the causes of alienation and it is again Heidegger who is the source of 
such a way, through his notion of the ‘fourfold’.
© 2012. The Authors.
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The concept of a ‘worldview’ appears to be self-explanatory. But is it? Or is its use so widespread 
that it has been assimilated into everyday language, so that, being covered by the veneer of 
‘common sense’, it hides more than it reveals? On the website of the journal, Koers, for instance 
(http://www.koersjournal.org.za), it is stated that the journal has ‘an integrated worldview as 
foundation’, as if it is self-explanatory. Although one could start reflection on the question posed 
above with a preliminary characterisation of ‘worldview’ – such as: ‘worldview’ is a concept 
that denotes a person’s, or people’s, ‘view’ or understanding of the world in broadly axiological 
terms – I believe that the question should be left open until one has pursued another question, 
namely, that of its historical and conceptual provenance as delineated by Martin Heidegger. This 
is the case because Heidegger’s ‘genealogy’ of ‘worldview’ (or ‘world picture’) clarifies the very 
grounds on which its use may be challenged. 
In this article, I therefore argue that it is indeed the case that the concept hides more than it 
reveals and, moreover, that it is often used to explain, without further ado, the source of 
differences, if not conflicts, amongst people from different cultures. But, putting it in terms of 
(Kantian) transcendental philosophy, what are the historical ‘conditions of its possibility’; that 
is, the conceptual-historical grounds on which its current widespread use is predicated, mostly 
unwittingly? The argument in this article is that Heidegger has shown persuasively that the 
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Wêreldbeskouings: ’n Seën of ’n vloek? Die begrip van ’n wêreldbeeld vind weerklank 
by ander begrippe, soos ‘kultuur’, beskawing, en lewenswyse. Daar kan geargumenteer 
word dat dit ’n moderne fenomeen is, waarvan die moontlikheid in die daeraad van die 
moderne epog verwerklik is. Die moontlikheid daarvan kan nietemin in beginsel so lank 
gelede as in Plato se Republiek nagespeur word. Dit is egter Heidegger wat die meeste insig 
gee in die aard van ’n wêreldbeeld, sowel as in die redes waarom dit eers in die moderne 
era gerealiseer is. Gevolglik voorsien ’n analise van Heidegger se essay, ‘Die tyd van die 
wêreldbeeld’ die raamwerk waarin daar betoog word dat wêreldbeelde sowel seëninge as 
vervloekinge is in die huidige era: seëninge, omdat, soos Harries aanvoer, ons verlos is van 
die moderne idee van een omvattende wêreldbeeld of ideologie, sodat ’n mens nie langer 
in slegs een ‘korrekte’ siening van die wêreld kan glo nie; vervloekinge, omdat hulle alle 
goedbedoelde pogings om oor sake van gemeenskaplike belang te kommunikeer, in die 
wiele ry. Dat daar ’n manier is om hierdie toedrag van sake met die hoop op oorkoming 
van die oorsake van vervreemding aan te spreek, is die taak wat hierdie artikel sigself gestel 
het om aan te toon en dit is weereens Heidegger, met sy begrip van die ‘viervoud’, wat die 
bron is hiervan.    
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very notion of a ‘worldview’ depends on a prior historical 
transition from an ancient and, later, a medieval conception 
of the world that is ontologically incompatible with the notion 
of a ‘worldview’ (or the ‘world as a picture’). Heidegger’s 
interpretation of the beginnings of modern thought indicates 
that the world as a ‘view’ or ‘picture’ is a way of thinking that 
was first made possible by the distinctive epistemological 
character of modern philosophy (paradigmatically, in the 
work of Kant) which revolves around the ‘representation’ of 
the world or reality, something which must be distinguished 
from reality as it exists ‘in itself’. But before embarking on 
a reconstruction of Heidegger’s critique of modernity as the 
time in which the ‘world as a view’ (‘picture’, ‘representation’) 
and therefore ‘worldviews’ first became possible, the way 
must be prepared briefly by several other considerations. 
Worldview, culture, civilisation and 
way of life
It stands to reason that people would identify with a ‘view’ 
of the ‘world’ made possible by one’s position in history, at 
a certain time and (cultural) place, so that one might agree 
with Franklin Baumer (1977:10), where he remarks of the 
present time, in contrast with the past: ‘Despite our superior 
knowledge in many areas, we see ourselves and the world 
only from our own perspective. This perspective is inevitably 
somewhat special, partial, and limited.’ Such limitedness is 
inescapable, of course, no matter where or when one lives 
or has lived, and perhaps this is what appears to make of 
a ‘worldview’ something exclusive – we do not expect that 
others, who adhere to different ‘worldviews’, would share 
in the one to which we adhere. (As an aside, it is striking 
how many ‘hits’ come up when one ‘googles’ the phrase, 
‘clashing worldviews’ on the Internet – probably quite telling 
regarding the time we live in!)  
However, the concept of a worldview is not the only one 
that implies cultural, religious or political exclusiveness. 
The concepts of ‘culture’ and ‘civilisation’ may also suggest 
such exclusiveness, for example in the way that Oswald 
Spengler, in his The decline of the West, after World War I 
(in Baumer 1977:502, 506–510), or, more recently, Samuel 
Huntington (1996), in his The clash of civilizations and the 
remaking of world order, intimate, namely, that major ‘cultures’ 
and ‘civilisations’ are mutually exclusive because of some 
fundamentally different conception of life and of society. 
Spengler distinguished eight such distinct cultures, of which 
European culture was only one. In addition, he claimed 
that all cultures sooner or later pass from the creative 
stage of ‘culture’ (where these differences would be most 
conspicuous) to that of world-weary ‘civilisation’, manifested 
in mechanisation, soullessness, and ‘mega-orientation’ (for 
example in the big city or megalopolis). Thinking of the 
present in these terms, it makes some sense, in as far as 
‘global’ (or globalising) ‘civilisation’ appears, according to 
some theorists of globalisation, to be increasingly similar or 
homogeneous in many respects (Steger 2003:70–73), despite 
cultural differences amongst nations.
Huntington (1996) seems to disagree on the question of 
(the significance of) increasing homogeneity accompanying 
the development of a ‘global’ society – in fact, he sees 
potential conflict amongst nations in the 21st century as 
being likely to issue from fundamentally irreconcilable 
‘civilisational’ differences (what one might call differences of 
‘worldview’). Huntington’s list of ‘major civilisations’, which 
are potentially (if not actually) in conflict with one another, 
includes Western civilisation, Eastern civilisation, Latin 
America, the Muslim world, the Orthodox world (of the 
former Soviet Union), sub-Saharan African civilisation, ‘lone’ 
countries such as Ethiopia and Israel, and ‘cleft’ countries, 
with large groups adhering to different civilisations, such as 
India, where Muslims and Hindus co-exist (albeit not always 
peacefully). From Huntington’s discussion of the differences 
amongst these ‘civilizations’, it is clear that he uses ‘culture’ 
and ‘civilisation’ synonymously, for instance insofar as he 
claims that future conflicts between and amongst nations will 
be primarily ‘cultural’, instead of ideological or economic: 
‘culture and cultural identities, which at the broadest 
level are civilization identities, are shaping the patterns of 
cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the post-Cold War 
world’ (Huntington 1996:20, see also 40–55).
 
The way that conceptions of civilisation and culture function 
in Spengler’s and Huntington’s thought is not the only 
counterpart to thinking in terms of worldviews separating 
people of fundamentally different persuasion, though. At 
the beginning of his book, The ethical function of architecture, 
Karsten Harries (1997:2) quotes the theorist of architecture, 
Siegfried Giedion, writing in the 1960s that the task 
confronting architecture at the time, was ‘the interpretation 
of a way of life valid for our period’. Like Descartes in the 
17th century, who decried the directionlessness in the 
sciences and philosophy of his time (and set out to resolve 
it by methodological means), Giedion said this in the face of 
what he saw as the ‘confusion’ reigning in architecture and 
other arts. As Harries reminds one, he nevertheless clung to 
his modernist belief that such confusion would be transitory; 
hence his conviction regarding the task facing architecture. 
The important thing here is to take note of the relevance of 
Harries’s problematisation of Giedion’s position, which he 
admits to having difficulty giving up, despite the subsequent 
exacerbation of what Giedion had experienced as ‘confusion’ 
in architecture. Firstly, he (Harries 1997:4) raises the question 
of what it means to say that the task of architecture is one 
of interpretation and, secondly – more importantly, given 
my question concerning ‘worldviews’ – he questions the 
meaning of talking about a ‘way of life valid for our period’ 
(or, in terms of my preliminary understanding of the term, 
a ‘shared worldview’ for our time). Is there such a way and, 
moreover, should people aspire to sharing in such a way of 
life? Is one of the blessings of postmodernity not precisely 
that it has delivered us from the modernist (ideological) 
illusion that an entire epoch, or society in the encompassing 
sense, could have consensus on what such a shared way of 
life might be? 
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The philosophical-historical 
possibility of worldviews
One might therefore rephrase what Giedion called a ‘valid 
way of life’ for a certain period as ‘a valid worldview’ for such 
an era, if it is understood, not so much that ‘worldview’ would 
include ‘a way of life’, but rather that the mere adherence to 
a ‘worldview’ is already an indication of a certain (cultural, 
civilisational) ‘way of life’ that differs from other ways of 
living. But what is a ‘worldview’ (German: ‘Weltanschauung’, 
‘Weltbild’), then? And is it possible, given what it means, that 
the existence – if such things do exist – of different, clashing 
worldviews (or cultures), today, is part of what are arguably 
the endemic, ongoing and worsening (social, political, 
economic and ecological) problems in today’s world? One 
might regard the event of 9/11 – which has been interpreted 
(ed. Borradori 2003) as such a clash – as an index of the 
irreconcilability of different worldviews, or, in Huntington’s 
terms, ‘civilisations’ (in this case the Western and the Muslim, 
respectively). My intuitive, off-the-cuff answer would be that 
irreconcilable ‘worldviews’ are indeed something that is at the 
root of, and further exacerbates, global problems in a variety 
of social and cultural spheres, ranging from politics to ecology, 
and that there is a reason for this, as Heidegger shows (below).
However, intuitive responses are not adequate; they 
require substantiation. One could write a book about this 
topic, but here I shall have to be relatively brief. Plato, in his 
myth of the cave (Plato 1991:Book 7) in the Republic, gives us 
what is arguably the earliest imagining of the kind of ‘view’ 
(of the world) one has in a movie theatre: people are depicted 
as a race of beings in a cave, forced by shackles around their 
necks from birth to face the back wall of the cave. On this 
wall, shadows appear. These are cast there by all kinds of 
beings and things moving from one side to the other behind 
them, whose shadows are projected on the wall by a huge 
fire behind these things, and further behind the fire there is 
the opening of the cave, with the sun shining outside. Plato’s 
account – through his spokesman, Socrates – of one person’s 
struggle to free him- or herself from his or her chains and 
painstakingly make his or her way past the moving things 
and the fire to the outside, brightly lit by sunlight, need 
not detain us here. Suffice it to say that, in a sense (with 
reservations), every generation of humans has to find novel 
ways to deal with ‘shadows’ on the cave walls peculiar to 
their own time – that is, the ideological elements in the era in 
which they live. 
What is important, is Plato’s belief that the ‘shadows’ (i.e. 
sensorily perceived things) viewed by the ‘cave-inhabitants’ 
are regarded by them as constituting reality, as well as his 
questioning of this.1 Although Plato thus provided the 
paradigm, as it were, of the ‘representation’ or ‘view’ (of 
the world) in his notion of (mere, misleading) ‘shadows’, 
surprisingly, the ancient Greeks did not adhere to a 
1.Needless to say, this parable has been interpreted and critiqued many times, 
amongst these being Luce Irigaray’s (1994) rehabilitation of the mode of existence in 
the cave and Kaja Silverman’s (2000) wonderful genealogy of Western devaluation 
of the sensory act of seeing as having its roots in Plato’s denigration of vision in the 
cave-myth – paradoxically, through a metaphorics of vision itself!
representationalist theory of knowledge. In such a theory, 
the problem would inevitably arise, as it did in the modern 
era around the 17th century, of whether the representation of 
reality is a faithful copy of what exists. Not only do Plato’s and 
Aristotle’s epistemologies (their theories of knowledge) bear 
testimony to this absence of a representationalist conception 
of knowledge (Zeller 1969:129–134, 173–178), but the cultural 
practice of Greek drama confirms it in a surprising manner. 
In Truth and method, Gadamer (1982:111) discusses the 
etymology of the word ‘theory’ – a word that is often used 
derogatorily by people outside academic circles as meaning 
‘removed from reality’. Gadamer’s account shows that it 
is exactly the opposite; the word ‘theory’ comes from the 
ancient Greek word, ‘theoros’, which denoted a spectator at 
a Greek drama, for instance an enactment of Sophocles’s 
Oedipus Rex, or Antigone. But far from being someone who 
is merely being ‘entertained’ by the unfolding dramatic 
action in the amphitheatre, the theoros is such because of their 
sharing in the unfolding of dramatic events on stage; that is, 
because of their own ethical involvement in the cosmic forces 
that are believed to shape those events. Understood in this 
way, the denouement in the tragedy of Antigone, for example, 
instantiates the conflict between two ethical laws, those of 
the family (linked to Antigone) and of the state (connected 
to Creon), respectively, in the process of which the one has 
to yield to the other, without losing its validity. And this 
conflict, enacted on stage, embodies tensions that were part 
and parcel of reality for the Greeks. ‘Viewing’, on the part of 
an audience, therefore, was a way of participating in or being 
‘carried away’ by the very fabric of supra-individual reality 
and not merely a representation of the world.  
Has ‘viewing’ retained this character of ethical involvement on 
the part of audiences or viewers, in an age when ‘viewing’ has 
become a pervasive activity, or perhaps rather ‘passivity’, in a 
media-saturated society? Not if one takes note of Heidegger’s 
([1938] 2009a) analysis of ‘worldview’, or of the ‘world as a 
view’, or as a ‘picture’ – Weltbild – which, I believe, one may 
here legitimately associate with Weltanschauung, or the way 
that the world is ‘viewed’ or ‘pictured’. Heidegger does not 
use ‘worldview’ in the sense that Gadamer (1982:401) does, 
where the latter argues – in agreement with Humboldt – that 
‘a view of language is a view of the world’, in other words, 
that the human world is essentially ‘linguistic in nature’ and 
therefore that ‘languages are views of the world’. It is easy to 
agree with the latter claim, insofar as every natural language 
embodies a ‘world’ in the sense of a systematic, interconnected 
totality of understanding of the world in all its diversity – 
compatible with Heidegger’s (1971a:44–45) understanding of 
‘world’ in ‘The origin of the work of art’, namely as the realm 
of openness or spaciousness within which a culture’s decisions 
regarding questions of history, knowledge, of good and 
of beauty are made, and which are preserved as such in a 
work of art. But ‘worldview’ as something distinctly modern 
is something else entirely and first requires thinking of the 
world as something to which humans do not have direct 
access, but only through representations.
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Heidegger on the world as a picture 
or view
Heidegger ([1938] 2009a) has something different in mind 
where he elaborates on ‘The age of the world picture’ (or ‘of the 
worldview’, or ‘the world as a view’) however. Here he is not 
thinking primarily of language in its world-constitutive sense, 
but of a mode of representation in the most fundamental sense, 
which underpins every other domain of human praxis in an 
identifiable era. He is interested particularly in the remarkable 
fact that the by now commonly accepted conception of 
knowledge, that science ‘represents’ (and also ‘re-presents’) 
reality, is of relatively recent, namely modern, origin.2 
Heidegger’s overall aim in this remarkable essay – which 
may, according to Figal (2009:25), be seen as ‘an especially 
concise example’ of the ‘metaphysical prehistory’ of ‘the 
technologized world’ – is to show that modern metaphysics, 
which grounds modern science, clears the way for the ‘setting-
in-place’ of beings, in this way making them available, 
or ultimately subject to technological appropriation. The 
‘world-picture’ or worldview is precisely what sets things up 
in a certain distinctive manner. His point of departure is the 
claim, that metaphysics (the most fundamental conception of 
the nature, or character, of beings): 
… grounds an age in that, through a particular interpretation 
of beings and through a particular comprehension of truth, it 
provides that age with the ground of its essential shape. This 
ground governs throughout all phenomena distinctive of the 
age. Conversely, in order for there to be an adequate reflection 
on these phenomena, their metaphysical ground must allow 
itself to be recognized in them. (Heidegger [1938] 2009a:207)
Amongst these phenomena that are characteristic of the 
modern age, he counts science and machine technology (the 
visible manifestation of the essence of modern technology, 
which should not be confused with it), art as aesthetics, 
human action comprehended as ‘culture’, and the ‘loss of the 
gods’, in the place of which one has ‘religious experience’. 
Consequently, he sets himself the task of indicating 
what notion of truth, and what conception of beings, are 
presupposed by these phenomena (Heidegger [1938] 
2009a:208). Here he concentrates on modern, mathematical 
science, which prepares the way for modern technology 
and elaborates on what he understands to be the essence of 
modern science in terms of the way that things, truth and 
knowledge are construed at its very basis.
Heidegger ([1938] 2009a:209) reminds one that modern 
‘science’ means something totally different from ancient 
Greek ‘epistêmê’ and medieval ‘doctrina’ or ‘scientia’, within 
the purview of which ‘truth’ and the nature of things meant 
something irreconcilably distinct from their meaning in 
2.By ‘modern’ Heidegger does not mean ‘contemporary’, but that which belongs to the 
modern epoch, with its ‘foundation’ in the 17th century (particularly in Descartes’s 
metaphysics) (Heidegger [1938] 2009a:216), although even contemporary, 
‘postmodern’ conceptions of knowledge are arguably still part of the continuing 
development of the idea of the world as a ‘view’ or a ‘picture’. One could argue that 
postmodern conceptions of that kind are a relativistic ‘radicalisation’ of the idea of 
a worldview, down to individuals claiming that something (anything, everything) is 
their ‘perception’ (of certain aspects of social reality, that is), and therefore cannot 
be challenged because it is ‘theirs’. Needless to say, such relativism can and should 
be challenged (see Olivier 2005) and the upshot of this article is (partly) to do so.
modern science. It therefore makes no sense to call modern 
science ‘more exact’ than ancient Greek or medieval science, 
because exactitude was not constitutive of these forms of 
science. Nor can one call the Aristotelian conception of 
bodies, compared to Galileo’s, false, because the underlying 
understanding of beings and bodies in Aristotle’s physics 
diverges from the modern conception underpinning Galileo’s 
and Newton’s work.
Heidegger ([1938] 2009a:209) considers the essence of modern 
science to consist in ‘research’, which is marked by knowledge 
(or ‘knowing’) being established as a ‘procedure’ (which is not 
the same as ‘methodology’) within some opened-up sphere of 
things in history or nature. It is the ‘opening-up’ – through the 
‘projection’ of an ‘outline’ of natural (or historical) processes 
– of such a domain that constitutes, for Heidegger, what 
research most fundamentally is. Within such a cleared realm, 
research consists of a commitment to a procedure of knowing 
which, in accordance with the nature of the projected domain, 
constitutes beings as objects of a specific kind. To clarify 
what is at stake here, Heidegger ([1938] 2009a:209) focuses on 
modern mathematical physics, ‘the earliest of modern sciences 
which is, at the same time, normative for the rest’.
What follows in Heidegger’s ([1938] 2009a:210–215) work 
is a lengthy discussion of the fundamental epistemological 
meaning of ‘mathematics’ amongst the Greeks, of motion, 
exactitude, research method (as precondition of objectifying 
a projected region), of the difference between mere 
(Aristotelian) observation and the scientific experiment as 
process of verifying the laws governing the relevant sphere 
of knowledge, and of the institutionalisation of the sciences, 
given their character of ‘constant activity’. Crucially, 
however, Heidegger’s reflection on the metaphysical ground 
of modern science (i.e. pertaining to its tacit conception 
of beings and truth) leads ultimately to the insight, that 
knowledge, conceived of as scientific research, of necessity 
construes beings and/or things as objects through 
representation, which, in its turn, depends on calculation 
(Heidegger [1938] 2009a:216). In short, beings ‘become 
objects of explanatory representation’. Only those things 
that achieve objecthood in this manner have the ontological 
status of ‘existing entities’. Therefore science, considered 
as research, is only attained ‘when, and only when, truth 
has transformed itself into the certainty of presentation’ 
(Vorstellen), an epistemological requirement which is first 
perceivable in Descartes’s metaphysics in the 17th century, 
which ‘opened up’ this ‘modern’ sphere of understanding 
of truth and of beings (Heidegger [1938] 2009a:216; Olivier 
1977).
Here, Heidegger ([1938] 2009a:216–217) warns against the 
common belief – that modernity’s advent consists in humanity 
liberating itself from the (ecclesiastic) ‘bonds’ of the Middle 
Ages. Although correct, merely masks a more significant, 
underlying truth, to wit, that what constitutes being human 
as such, is transformed into human beings ‘becoming subjects’ 
for the first time. This engenders, as he points out, the 
‘interplay’ between ‘subjectivism and objectivism’, but more 
importantly, it brings us face to face with the connection 
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between the human subject as the ‘referential center of beings 
as such’ (Heidegger [1938] 2009a:217) and the meaning of the 
phrase, ‘modern world picture’ (worldview). At first blush, 
it seems to suggest a ‘picture’ or ‘view’ of the world, from 
which it would follow that every historical era has its own 
‘worldview’ or ‘picture’. Heidegger ([1938] 2009a:217–218) 
soon disabuses his readers of this (mis)conception, by arguing 
that ‘world’ denotes ‘beings in their entirety’, including 
nature, history, as well as the ‘world-ground’ (regardless of 
how it is conceived of), and that ‘worldview’ or ‘picture’ does 
not mean a depiction, picture, or view of the world. Rather, it 
means that ‘the world [is] grasped as a picture’ (or view). This 
implies that beings may be said to exist as knowable entities 
in so far as ‘they are set in place by the human that presents 
and produces’, in other words, by the human subject as the 
ontological ground of beings. 
It would therefore be a mistake, according to Heidegger 
([1938] 2009a:218–219), to talk tautologically of the ‘modern 
world picture’ (or worldview), because modernity is the 
first epoch in which things can be thought of as being ‘part of 
[or included in] the picture’, through their being (re)presented 
by the human subject. Nor can one speak legitimately of a 
change from the medieval, or the ancient Greek, worldview 
to the modern one, simply because the world as a picture or 
view did not constitute the fundamental ontological fabric 
of those ages – in the Middle Ages, a being was thought of 
as having been created by God as ‘ens creatum’, and as fitting 
into a hierarchy of beings, whilst, in Greek antiquity, human 
beings were considered ‘receivers’ of beings which ‘gathered’ 
humans into a certain ‘presence’ by their ‘openness’. In neither 
of these historical periods could the world therefore have been 
understood as a picture or view. Ancient Greeks apprehended 
things in the world; modern humans (re)present them, in 
this way bringing them in alignment with the ontological 
framework that is constitutive of modernity – a framework 
that has been constituted by humans themselves.
The upshot of these developments, for Heidegger 
([1938] 2009a:221) is that, no sooner has the world been equated 
with a picture, than ‘the position of the human is conceived 
as worldview’. He ([1938] 2009a:221) concedes that, already 
in the 19th century, ‘worldview’ was thought of as ‘view of 
life’, but insists that this demonstrates ‘how decisively the 
world becomes a picture as soon as the human makes his life 
as subject the primary center of reference’. It is for this reason 
that a ‘medieval worldview’ or a ‘Catholic worldview’ is an 
impossibility. To sum up, for Heidegger ([1938] 2009a:221), 
‘the fundamental event of modernity is the conquest of 
the world as picture’, and it is to this that the variety of 
worldviews that may be distinguished today, can be 
attributed – ‘…humans’ fundamental relation to beings as 
a whole is defined as a worldview’. Small wonder the 
expression has become common usage, as he notes. But this 
state of affairs has further ramifications and implications. 
Reading Heidegger’s ([1938] 2009a) ‘The age of the world 
picture’ together with the interview that the magazine, Der 
Spiegel, conducted with him in 1966, on condition that it 
only be published after his death (he died in 1976), yields 
interesting results. He says there (2009b:324) that ‘... it should 
have become more evident in the last thirty years that the 
global movement of modern technology is a force whose 
scope in determining history can hardly be overestimated’. 
He adds that he does not see in democracy, for example, ‘an 
actual engagement with the technological world’, given that 
it rests on the assumption, ‘that humans have control over 
the essence of technology’, which ‘is not possible’.
 
Keeping in mind that – as previously set out in Heidegger’s 
(1977) ‘The question concerning technology’ – the ‘essence of 
technology’ (mentioned earlier) is itself nothing technological, 
but rather a way in which being reveals itself, it should 
be clear, firstly, that humanity has been unable to grasp 
this fundamental truth. Secondly, that it is not possible, in 
principle, for humans to ‘control’ (itself something integral 
to a technological mindset!) this essence of technology, which 
is a manifestation of ‘something’ which humans and all other 
beings are subject to, namely being ‘itself’ (which is not the 
same as ‘a being’, or entity). This essence of technology is 
characterised by Heidegger (1977:4, 19–20, 2009b:326) as 
‘Ge-stell’ (variously translated as ‘Enframing’, ‘Framework’ 
or ‘Be-setting’) and suggests a way of ‘ordering’ the real in 
such a way that the earth, or nature, is ‘set-upon’ (assaulted), 
in this manner reducing or transforming it into a ‘standing-
reserve’, or (natural as well as human) ‘resources’ for use. In 
the process, the ownmost ‘being’ of all the entities ‘ordered’ 
in this way is denied; that is, humans and other creatures are 
alienated from what makes them into what they distinctively 
are in the first place. 
What does this have to do with the ‘age of the world 
picture’, one may wonder. It will be recalled that Heidegger 
conceives of this age as one where the way was prepared for 
technological ‘control’ of nature by modern science, insofar 
as the latter interprets nature in a series of representations 
where nature is re-presented ‘objectively’ and mathematically 
in terms of calculability. Such calculability paves the way 
for technological control (through machine technology), 
which would be unthinkable without it. This means that 
representation – which, it will be recalled, is a way of 
conceiving of the world as a picture – is a prerequisite for the 
advent of technology (Heidegger [1938] 2009a:208), which 
people erroneously understand instrumentally; that is, as a 
series of ‘tools’ by means of which nature (and people) may 
be controlled. In truth, however, the essence of technology, 
Ge-stell – or technology as ‘a power’ by which humans are 
be-set, and which has been ‘sent’, ‘revealed’, or made possible 
by ‘being’ – is nothing that can be controlled (because it is 
what makes such vaunted ‘control’ through technical means 
possible in the first place), and has long since ceased being a 
‘tool’ (Heidegger 2009b:325). 
Technology – the essence of which has not been addressed 
thoughtfully by humans, according to Heidegger 
(2009b:325−333) – is therefore part and parcel of the era in 
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which the world has been conceived in terms of ‘viewing’, 
‘picturing’, or (what amounts to the same thing) being 
‘represented’. Only in this era has it become possible to speak 
of ‘worldviews’ (corresponding to the ‘world as a picture’); 
that is, ways of viewing the world, which could be compared 
with one another, and which could comprise the basis for a 
belligerent and bellicose squaring-off of adherents who have 
pledged their allegiance to different, inherently relativistic 
worldviews (including the Christian, Muslim, Judaic, Hindu, 
Satanic). This happens without the possibility of ever being 
able to settle the question once and for all, which of these is the 
‘correct’ one (which is why they are inescapably relativistic: 
‘This is true for me, if not for you’, etc.). The reason for this 
is simply that, to be able to do this, one would have to have 
access to the ‘real’ world for reasons of comparison, and no 
such access is possible in the age of the ‘world as a picture’, 
where representation mediates between such a multivocal 
ground of all representations and the latter themselves. More 
importantly, however, today these ‘worldviews’ compete on 
the terms set by the essence of technology (itself prepared for 
by the ontological and epistemological possibility of viewing 
or picturing), which means that humans are ’be-set’ and 
their activities ‘ordered’ within the competing frameworks 
of these worldviews, each one of which is ‘technologised’ in 
the sense of reducing people to a standing-reserve of resources 
for purposes of mere use. 
The ability to grasp the full consequences of this is hampered 
by what Heidegger (2009b:326) sees as the distance 
separating a technological state – in which people are 
living today – and living in accordance with the essence of 
technology, which – if understood – would enable humans 
to grasp this essence (Ge-stell, En-framing, Be-setting) as one 
possibility, amongst several (including art and religion), 
of being ‘revealing’ or showing itself to humanity. Once 
understood, the totalising, suffocating effects of technology 
on human actions would be placed in the perspective of 
being one of several different manifestations of being and 
humans would be freed from its grip. 
Understanding the ground of possibility of ‘worldviews’ 
therefore enables one to understand their significance, their 
relative, culture-bound limitations and importance, too, and 
liberates one from the equally suffocating grip that they 
have on many people. Here, as in many other instances, 
critical, reflective philosophical thinking is a prerequisite for 
emancipation. In brief, one might say that worldviews are, 
at present (given the time of the ‘worldview’ in which we 
live), unavoidable, and are not quite what one might call 
‘blessings’, but do provide the conceptual, if not ideological 
framework in which people of different cultures feel at home. 
When they start functioning more like ‘curses’ is when their 
conceptual (or ideological) exclusiveness leads to conflict 
between people from different cultures, and no possibility 
of rapprochement seems possible. As intimated earlier, the 
event that has become known as 9/11 stands as an index 
for such (violent) incompatibility between worldviews 
(ed. Borradori 2003; Olivier 2007). 
An alternative to worldviews 
Heidegger’s ‘fourfold’ 
But what could function, in its place, to provide the terms 
of orientation in an increasingly confusing, complex world, 
if not a worldview of some kind? Here, too, turning to 
Heidegger provides valuable pointers. What I am thinking 
of is what he describes as ‘the fourfold’ – the interrelated 
concepts: earth, sky, mortals and divinities – as set out in 
Building dwelling thinking (1971b).3 These four ‘principles’ or 
‘values’ do not constitute a ‘worldview’, but transcend such 
representations because they operate at a more fundamental 
level than that of representation. In fact, the (human) value 
of the latter may be gauged through the axiological measure 
that they instantiate. 
According to Heidegger (1971b), together, the ‘fourfold’ 
comprises the indispensable means of (axiological) orientation 
in the world for human beings. This means that, if one or 
more of these are absent as ‘markers’ to determine one’s 
‘place’ in the world, one would not be able to claim that one 
is living a truly ‘human’ life. This is why he remarks that 
the four together comprise ‘a simple oneness’. ‘Earth’ must 
be understood in the most archetypal sense conceivable: 
the earth as condition of the possibility of life, including 
human life, but also as that which resolutely resists humans’ 
penetrating, objectifying (and ultimately violating) scrutiny. 
It is the ‘serving bearer, blossoming and fruiting, spreading 
out in rock and water, rising up into plant and animal’ 
(1971b:149). The ‘sky’ is the ‘vault’ that is the matrix of 
seasonal gifts and blessings, as well as inclemency, but it 
marks simultaneously the limit that reminds humans of their 
finitude. ‘Mortals’ are humans whose nature is to be ‘capable 
of death’ (1971b:151) and ‘divinities’ are the ‘messengers of the 
godhead’ (1971b:150), who are awaited in hope by mortals, 
whether they reveal or conceal themselves. Even if one 
preferred to use different words for the intrinsic ‘values’ (for 
want of a better word) that these four concepts denote, they 
would have to resonate with their meaning. 
The American Heidegger scholar, Karsten Harries 
(1997:159–162), provides a lucid, insightful interpretation of 
the notion of the ‘fourfold’. He reminds one that the ‘earth’ as 
the ‘given’, or as ‘material transcendence’, is a ‘gift’ uncreated 
by human understanding, which, as such, limits the ‘world’ 
or sphere of intelligibility. He further points out that what 
‘opens’ humans to ‘earth’ in this sense, is the body and urges 
one to remember that: 
… the embodied self is a caring, desiring self. To be in the 
presence of the earth is inevitably to be affected, moved, claimed. 
Earth thus … refers to the elusive affective ground without which 
all talk of essences, meaning, values, or divinities is ultimately 
groundless, merely idle talk. (Harries 1997:159)
In other words, that which limits ‘world’ – the cultural, 
linguistic space of a tradition – is the earth or ‘ground’ which 
3.On previous occasions (see Olivier 1998, 2003), I elaborated on the ‘fourfold’ in 
the context of the pertinence of Heidegger’s thought for architecture, and for a 
specific instance of installation art, respectively. In the former (1998), I look at 
an earlier work as well, namely The origin of the work of art, in which Heidegger 
first introduces the concept of ‘earth’ in the sense that it bears here, as well as its 
counterpart, namely ‘world’. 
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moves humans as affective, caring, desiring beings in the 
first place to articulate their desires, fears and projects, and 
these articulations belong to the open cultural space of 
what Heidegger earlier referred to as ‘world’. The ‘earth’ is 
therefore that which affects the human, embodied self. Seen 
in this way, ‘earth’ is, despite its inscrutability, ultimately 
inscribed as such in language (in an encompassing sense, 
which includes ‘discourse’) as that which enables humans to 
traverse the realm of openness or ‘world’.
Harries’s (1997:160) elaboration on ‘sky’ reminds one that, in 
addition to what Heidegger says about it, it is metaphorically 
linked to the awareness that humans are able to surpass the 
‘here and now’, that they are always ‘ahead of’ or ‘beyond’ 
themselves. This, says Harries, is partly what the spiritual 
dimension of being human entails. This is a reminder of 
Heidegger’s (1978:458) contention, in Being and time, that 
humans are not merely characterised by ‘thrownness’, but 
also by ‘projection’, even if they further tend to be subject to 
‘falling’. ‘Projection’ here means the ineradicable capacity of 
individuals to appropriate a given situation and transform 
or elaborate on it creatively, even if the tendency to fall back 
into the comfort zone of tradition and custom – or, one may 
add, of valorised discourses such as those of bureaucracy 
and capitalism – always exercises its gravitational pull on 
them. Hence, ‘sky’ suggests the creative ability to renew or 
transform cultural traditions or the ‘normalising’ discourses 
surrounding one in the face of their inherent tendency to 
regulate one’s life in a carceral manner.
Harries (1997:160) rightly connects ‘mortals’ with Heidegger’s 
earlier analysis, in Being and time, of Dasein’s resolute 
acceptance of its death as a prerequisite for an ‘authentic’ 
existence. As long as one does not make peace with ageing 
and everything that accompanies it, one is also never free 
to live a culturally or intellectually creative life. Succinctly 
put: accepting one’s mortality liberates one for ‘adding one’s 
verse’ to the ongoing drama of the tradition, as the fictional 
Mr Keating in Peter Weir’s film, Dead Poets Society (1989) 
would say.  
Heidegger’s ‘divinities’ – as Harries (1997:160–161) observes, 
the most problematical of the ‘fourfold’, given the secularism 
of the present age – nevertheless points, for Heidegger, to 
the deepest source of meaning for humans. Not, to be sure, 
the god or ‘God’ of any tradition, but precisely the divine 
as unknown, because naming it violates, for Heidegger, 
what is essential about ‘… the many-voiced ground of all 
meaning and value’ (Harries 1997:161). If this is what the 
term ‘divinities’ ultimately denotes, it is the deepest source 
of all cultural activities and practices on the part of humans, 
including cultural practices which are usually, today, situated 
in and informed by ‘worldviews’ of various (irreconcilable) 
stripes. 
Conclusion
What is the relevance of Heidegger’s discourse on the 
‘fourfold’ for this inquiry into the status of ‘worldviews’, 
then? I believe that it may be understood as a touchstone 
for ascertaining whether cultural practices may be regarded 
as being reconcilable with a truly human way of living, 
of being in the world. As such a touchstone, the fourfold – 
earth, sky, mortals and divinities – instantiates, despite its 
‘members’ belonging together as a kind of ‘unity’, a set of 
complex, interrelated ‘existential’ markers or signifiers that 
capture virtually all the most important constituents of a 
life or existence that is recognisably human. By implication, 
if one (or more) of them is not accommodated by a cultural 
practice, or does not resonate with such practices, something 
essential or indispensable may not only be absent from them; 
such practices may indeed be inimical to a truly human 
existence. Understood in this way, the fourfold may be 
understood as the set of principles in terms of which what is 
known today as ‘worldviews’ may be judged – if compatible 
with it, a worldview would not be recalcitrant in the face of 
other cultures and their practices, as long as the latter are 
also consonant with the fourfold; if incompatible with the 
fourfold’s implicit requirements, it would be. Hence, for as 
long as the time of the world-picture and (correspondingly) 
of worldviews is upon us, Heidegger’s discernful evocation 
of the lineaments of a human life worth living may offer 
insight into worldviews with respect to their humanness 
and help one negotiate the minefield of relativistic conflicts 
amongst them. 
Regarding the titular question of this article, one might say 
that ‘worldviews’ – insofar as they are, as this article has 
shown, representations of the world, and do not coincide with 
‘the world’ in completely unambiguous terms – are a blessing 
for those who, given their representation of the world in 
familiar cultural terms, feel at home in them. However, 
they are a curse insofar as, through their exclusiveness, they 
militate against mutual understanding and communication 
between or amongst those adhering to different worldviews 
or ‘ways of life’. Should Heidegger’s ‘fourfold’, considered 
as a touchstone or measure for assessing worldviews vis-á-
vis their viability for a truly human existence, be allowed 
to function as a lens for scrutinising such worldviews, and 
they should be found wanting, they ought to be rejected. 
The most radical implications of the ‘fourfold’ as touchstone 
for authentic humanness, however, would be to reject the 
notion of a ‘worldview’ altogether. Instead, one should seek 
understanding of, as well as reconciliation with, a mode of 
being-in-the-world that surpasses the representationalist 
alienation from the earth and from one another, as embodied 
in the relativistic juxtaposition of mutually exclusive 
worldviews. Heidegger’s ‘fourfold’ points towards such a 
mode of being-in-the-world.  
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